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Dana Lydell Smith appeals from 
recent Rule 35 motion. 
d 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
order denying 
The district court sentenced Smith to a term of 14 years with seven years 
determinate upon his conviction for grand theft, entering judgment on March 31, 
2008. (#35216 R., vol. II, pp. 435-39.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. 
State v. Smith, 2009 Unpublished Opinion No. 467, Docket Nos. 35216/35604 
(Idaho App. May 20, 2009). 
On January 16, 2015, Smith filed a "Motion for Correction or Reduction of 
Sentence" pursuant to I.C.R. 35. (R., pp. 50-52 (capitalization altered).) Smith 
claimed his sentence was illegal because the district court had not ordered a 
psychiatric evaluation for sentencing. (R., p. 51.) The district court denied the 
motion, reasoning that Smith was claiming to have been sentenced in an illegal 
manner, which, because the motion was not brought within 120 days, was 
untimely. (R., pp. 53-54.) Smith filed a notice of appeal timely from the district 
court's order. (R., pp. 65-67.) 
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the on as: 
1. Is a sentence imposed upon a defendant who has 
found to be incompetent to stand trial but never found to 
have been restored to competency an illegal sentence which 
can be corrected any time under I.C.R 35(a)? 
2. Alternatively, did the court err in failing to rule on the motion 
for appointment of counsel in light of the meritorious motion? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1 Has Smith failed to show error in the district court's holding that failure to 
order a psychiatric evaluation for sentencing is not an issue that can be 
properly raised or considered in a Rule 35 motion brought after the 120-
day deadline has passed? 
2. Was Smith not entitled to counsel because the district court lacked 
jurisdiction? 
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I. 
Raised Or Considered in A Ruie 35 Motion Brought Lonq After The 120-Day 
Deadline Has Passed 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded that Smith's claim that the court erred by not 
ordering a psychiatric evaluation for sentencing was a claim that his sentence 
had been imposed in an illegal manner, and was therefore untimely because not 
brought within 120 days as required by I.C.R. 35(b). (R., pp. 53-54.) Smith 
argues that his competency at sentencing "is not a claim that the sentence was 
imposed in an illegal manner" but is instead a challenge to "the court's power to 
impose a sentence at all" and that "the illegality of the sentence is apparent from 
the face of the record." (Appellant's brief, p. 6.) Review shows Smith's argument 
is without merit 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a sentence is illegal or was imposed in an illegal manner is 
question of free review. State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 485, 272 P.3d 417, 
457 (2012). 
C. The District Court's Allegedly Erroneous Failure To Order A Psychiatric 
Evaluation For Sentencing Did Not Render The Sentence Illegal 
A motion to correct a sentence that was imposed in an illegal manner 
"must be filed within 120 days of the entry of the judgment imposing sentence." 
i.C.R. 35(b). The 120-day filing limit of Rule 35(b) is jurisdictional, and therefore 
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550, 835 P.2d 1361 (Ct. App. 1 
1 
filing dead described 
[Rule 35] create a jurisdictional limitation on the authority of the trial court to 
entertain motions under the rule. Without a timely filing, the court cannot 
consider the motion." (internal citations omitted)). 
In contrast to the jurisdictional time limit imposed upon a claim the 
sentence was imposed in an illegal manner, a district court "may correct a 
sentence that is illegal from the face of the record at any time." !.C.R. 35(a). 
This language, however, is "narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from 
the face of the record, i.e., does not involve significant questions of fact or require 
an evidentiary hearing." State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 86, 218 P.3d 1143, 
1147 (2009). 
In this case Smith was sentenced to 14 years with seven years 
determinate upon his conviction for grand theft, a facially legal sentence. I.C. § 
18-2408(2)(a) (grand theft punishable by up to 14 years in prison). He moved for 
a reduction of his sentence from 14 years to eight years because he was 
"mentally incompetent and was tried, convicted, sentence[d] and convicted [sic] 
while Defendant was incompetent" making his mental health a "factor" at 
sentencing. (R., pp. 51-52 (capitalization altered).) Specifically, he claimed his 
sentence was "illegal as there was no psychiatric exam as per I.C. § 19-2522" 
and the judge "struck" the mitigating mental health evidence. (Id.) Because the 
sentence is facially legal and the only illegality claimed-that district court did 
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manner in 
it lacked jurisdiction over 
On appeal Smith's counsel argues that his sentence was illegal because 
the "record plainly shows that Mr. Smith was found to be incompetent and 
trial court never found he had been restored to competency" and therefore the 
district court was legally "barred ... from sentencing him." (Appellant's brief, p. 
7.) Besides being a different claim than raised below, this argument is based on 
a false assertion. Nowhere in the record is there any finding that Smith was 
incompetent. 
There is in the record evidence relevant to Smith's competency. Attached 
to the PSI are several psychological evaluations. Dr. Smith's May 2, 2007, 
evaluation reports that Smith can "understand the proceedings against him," the 
"roles of the various players in the court process," and "the possible 
consequences he is facing." (Smith Evaluation, p. 8 (attached to #35216 PSI).) 
However, Smith's "ability to assist in his own defense presents a question" 
because his tendency to "ramble off rather inappropriately . . . likely seriously 
impairs his ability to work systematically with his attorney in a sustained fashion." 
(Id.) However, once the proper medications "become effective" Smith "could in 
all likelihood proceed with matters in court." (Id.) According to a subsequent 
mental health report, prepared on November 8, 2007, and also attached to the 
PSI, Smith does not suffer from a "major mental illness," but rather a "personality 
disorder" that causes Smith to "act out" if he does not get what he wants. 
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1 is 
on 
16 , p. was on 3/31/08).) At a " 
could be made only after an evidentiary hearing, held either before sentencing or 
in response to the Rule 35 motion. Smith's appellate counsel's claim that there 
was a "finding" he was incompetent is false and misleading. 
Even if not premised on a false assertion, Smith's argument would still be 
without merit. The Idaho Code prohibits sentencing a mentally incompetent 
person "so long as such incapacity endures," I.C. § 18-210, and also establishes 
a detailed procedure for determining such incapacity and its duration, I.C. §§ 18-
211, 18-212, 18-215. Under this procedure the question of competency "shall be 
determined by the court," and if the court finds the defendant incompetent to 
proceed it must generally suspend the proceedings. I.C. § 18-212(1) and (2). To 
the extent Smith claims the trial court erred by finding him competent; making no 
finding on his competency; or by failing to suspend the proceedings until he was 
determined to be competent, such are claims the sentence was imposed in an 
illegal manner. Indeed, if such error were demonstrated by a timely Rule 35 
motion or on appeal, there is nothing in the law that would prohibit imposition of 
the exact same ~entence upon Smith once he is determined to be competent. It 
is not the sentence that Smith claims on appeal to be illegal, only the manner by 
which it was imposed upo~him. 
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11. 
The District Court Did Not Err By Not Appointing Counsel Because It Lacked 
Jurisdiction Over The Case 
A. Introduction 
Smith claims the district court erred by not appointing counsel to represent 
him on his Rule 35 motion. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-11.) Because the district 
court lacked jurisdiction, Smith has failed to show reversible error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Denial of court appointed counsel under I.C. § 19-852(b )(3) is "within the 
court's discretion" as long as "the court appropriately finds that the claims 
presented are frivolous." Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 468-69, 926 P.2d 
1314, 1315-16 (Ct. App. 1996) (addressing appointment of counsel in post-
conviction proceedings). 
C. Smith Was Not Entitled To Counsel Because The District Court Lacked 
Jurisdiction 
A criminal defendant has the statutory right to counsel at all stages of the 
criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion. Murray v. State, 121 
Idaho 918, 923 n.3, 828 P.2d 1323, 1328 n.3 (Ct. App. 1992). However, the trial 
court may deny appointment of counsel if the Rule 35 motion is frivolous or one 
that a reasonable person with adequate means would not be willing to bring at 
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documentation that may support the motion. State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 525, 
873 P.2d 167, 270 (Ct. App. 1994). Thus, a district court is within its discretion to 
deny a request for court appointed counsel under I.C. § 19-852(b)(3) if it 
appropriately finds, after reviewing the contents of the motion, that the claims 
presented are frivolous. Swisher, 129 Idaho at 468-69, 926 P.2d at 1315-16. 
As shown above, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the 
motion. Because the court lacked jurisdiction, it also lacked jurisdiction to 
appoint counsel for Smith to pursue his motion. Smith has shown no error. 1 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's 
denial of Smith's Rule 35 motion. 
DATED this 5th day of January, 2016. 
Deputy Attorney Gene al 
1 Because the district court lacked jurisdiction over the Rule 35 motion, even if the 
district court had jurisdiction to consider the motion for appointment of counsel 
any failure to rule on it was also necessarily harmless. Swisher v. State, 129 
Idaho 467, 470-471, 926 P.2d 1314, 1317-1318 (Ct. App. 1996) (district court's 
failure to consider motion for appointed counsel before dismissing post-
conviction action was harmless error because Swisher's claims were time-
barred, and therefore frivolous). 
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